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ABSTRACT 
Despite an unprecedented reduction in trade barriers since World War 11, some countrics continue 
to impose sizable tariffs on forest products imports. The Vancouvcr Agreement of the APEC countries 
calls for the elimination of  all tariff's on paper products by the year 2002 and on wood products by 
the year 2004. Howevcr, several APEC countries are strongly resisting tariff renlovals. Protected 
industries emphasize the potential job loss of trade liberaliz;ition, but liberali~ation also benefits con- 
sumers by lowering the cost of the good and offering a widcr choice of goods. This paper presents 
an empirical model for comparing the benefits and cost\ of  trade liberalization. The model is applied 
to the elimination of the Philippine tariff on lumber imports. The results of the analysis suggest thal 
the welfare gains from removing thc tariff substantially cxceed thc job displaccrnent costs. 
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THE ECONOMICS OF FOREST PROL)IJCTS tion in nine sectors, one of which is forest 
TRADE IJBERALIZATION products. All tariffs would be eliminated on 
Despite an unprecedented reduction in trade 
barriers since World War 11, some countries 
continue to impose significant barriers to trade 
in forest products. For example, Asian tariffs 
on wood and paper products range up to 40%. 
In 1994, Malaysia imposed a 20% tariff on 
kraft linerboard, designed to preclude foreign 
competition with a local production facility 
(Moore 1998). The reasons given for these tar- 
iffs include the ~rotection of domestic indus- 
try and the reduction of deforestation. Despite 
broad global support of free trade, efforts to 
remove specific trade barriers inevitably are 
vigorously resisted by the affected industry. 
The 1997 Vancouver agreement of APEC 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Council) is the most 
important current effort to liberalize forest 
products trade. APEC is an international fo- 
rum composed of 21 Pacific Rim economies, 
established in 1989 to promote economic in- 
tegration and development in the Pacific Re- 
gion. 
In November 1997, President Clinton and 
other APEC leaders called for trade liberaliza- 
paper products by 2002 and on wood products 
no later than 2004. APEC members agreed to 
conclude negotiations by June 1998 and to im- 
plement the plan in 1999. The 1998 negotia- 
tions did not go well, however, and failed to 
achieve significant progress towards imple- 
menting the agreement. The countries most 
strongly resisting trade liberalization are Ja- 
pan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, and 
Thailand (Moore 1998). The fundamental rea- 
son for opposition to trade liberalization is that 
the reduction of trade barriers will impose 
costs on members of the protected industry, 
even though it benefits society as a whole. 
A study by Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) il- 
lustrates the politics of protectionism. Huf- 
bauer and Elliott estimated the welfare effects 
on the United States of removing the 6.51% 
countervailing duty (CVD) on imports of Ca- 
nadian softwood lumber imposed by the Unit- 
ed States in 1992 (the CVD was subsequently 
replaced by a combined quota and tariff). 
They estimate that the potential consumer gain 
from eliminating the CVD would be 459 rnil- 
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lion, the producer loss would be $264 million, 
and the duty revenue loss to the government 
would be $183 million. The job loss would be 
605 jobs. 
A net welfare gain of $1 1 million and a loss 
of only 605 jobs suggest that the CVD has a 
modest net impact on the United States. The 
U.S. lumber industry's resistance to renloval 
of the CVD is explained by the welfare trans- 
fer from producers to consumers. Removal of 
the CVD would benefit U.S. consumers sig- 
nificantly more than it would cost producers 
($459 million compared to $264 million), but 
the consumer gain would be distributed thinly 
amongst millions of U.S. lumber consumers, 
whereas the producer cost would be concen- 
trated on a relatively smaller number of pro- 
ducers. Individual producers are more likely 
to feel pain from removal of the CVD than are 
individual consumers likely to notice any im- 
provement in their welfare. 
Fig. 1 .  The welfare effects of tariff removal. 
THE TRADE LIBERALIZATION MODEL 
Introduction 
This section outlines the comparative static 
"gains-from-trade" approach developed by 
Leamer and Stem (1970) and Magee (1972), 
and elaborated upon by Szenberg et al. (1977) 
and Hufbauer and Elliott (1994), to measure 
the welfare effects of trade barriers. The meth- 
od used to quantify the welfare effects follows 
Leamer and Stern (1970), Szenberg et al. 
(1977), and Roussland and Soumela (1985). 
A country is assumed to impose a tariff on 
imports of a forest product. The question is: 
What will be the welfare effects of removing 
the tariff? There typically are three potential 
effects: (1) the welfare gain from eliminating 
the deadweight losses of the tariff, (2) the jobs 
lost as a result of imports replacing the do- 
mestic import-competing good, and (3) a 
change in the terms of trade. The model mea- 
sures the economic efficiency effects of re- 
moving a trade barrier; it does not provide an 
answer to equity considerations, such as if and 
how to compensate those who suffer losses 
from tariff removal. That is a political ques- 
tion. 
The model assumes that the imported and 
domestic good are perfect substitutes. This ap- 
pears to be a reasonable assumption in the pre- 
sent case, and substantially reduces the data 
required to empirically estimate the model. 
This is an important consideration when data 
are limited. This assumption also means that 
there will be no terms of trade effect. The per- 
fect substitutes model is founded on five key 
assumptions: 
the domestic good and the imported good 
are perfect substitutes, 
the supply schedule for the imported 
good is perfectly elastic, 
the supply schedule for the domestic 
good is less than perfectly elastic, 
a change in the production of the good 
does not affect prices for substitute 
goods, and 
all markets are perfectly competitive. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of an import 
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tariff on the market for a particular good in 
the importing country. Let D and S, be the 
demand and supply curves for the good in the 
importing country. The supply curve for the 
imported good, S,, is perfectly elastic at the 
world price, P,. The tariff-burdened domestic 
price is P,, which lies above the world price 
by T, the specific equivalent of the ad valorem 
tariff rate, t, where T = P, - P ,  = AP, and t 
= APIP, Domestic consumption is C,,, domes- 
tic production is Q,,, imports are QOC,,, and 
consumers' surplus is area P,,ab. 
There are three theoretical considerations 
that must be addressed before we proceed. 
First, the demand curve, D, is properly defined 
as a compensated demand curve; however, for 
present purposes, we assume that consumption 
enjoys a zero income effect and, as a conse- 
quence, the ordinary demand curve corre- 
sponds to the compensated demand curve. 
Second, I ignore any possible negative exter- 
nalities of production. If there are important 
negative externalities, then the computations 
should be based upon the social cost curve, 
which would lie above the private cost curve 
by the amount of the negative externality (see 
Anderson 1992 and Braga 1992, for discus- 
sions of tariff effects in the presence of neg- 
ative externalities). Third, I assume that re- 
moval of the tariff will have no effect on other 
industries. With the assumption of zero in- 
come effect, absence of negative externalities, 
and no impact on other industries, triangles 
dce and fbg represent the deadweight losses of 
the tariff. 
If the government removes the tariff, the 
domestic price will decline to the world price, 
or to P,. Consumers will take advantage of the 
lower price of the imported good and substi- 
tute it for the domestic good. Domestic pro- 
ducers will reduce the price of the domestic 
good in order to remain competitive. A new 
equilibrium will be established when the do- 
mestic price falls to P,, and domestic and im- 
port prices are equal. At price, P,, consumers 
will consume C ,, producers would produce Q,, 
and imports will be Q, C , . The increase in im- 
ports comes from two sources: one is the re- 
placement of domestic production by imports, 
Q(,QI; the other is the increase in domestic 
consumption of the good, C,,C,. 
The price and quantity changes following 
removal of the tariff increase consumers' sur- 
plus by area P,P,bg. Part of the consumer sur- 
plus gain, however, is welfare transfers from 
producers (area P,P,cd) and the government 
(area ecbf) to consumers, and hence transfers 
are not a gain in social welfare. The gain in 
welfare from trade liberalization is the sum of 
triangles fbg and dce, which is henceforth 
identified as "deadweight gain." Deadweight 
gain fbg arises because consumers now pay 
less for the good than they paid when supply 
was restricted by the tariff and because some 
consumers priced out of the market entirely by 
the tariff now enter the market. Deadweight 
gain dce is an efficiency gain from the im- 
provement in the allocation of resources. The 
tariff inserts a wedge between the world price 
and domestic price. The increase in domestic 
price induces a transfer of resources toward 
the production of the import substitute and 
away from other sectors where those resources 
could have been used more efficiently. Re- 
moval of the tariff encourages a reallocation 
of resources to their highest social use. 
I now develop a method for estimating the 
values of the two deadweight gains triangles, 
dce and fbg. 
Mathematically, 
1 
area dce = Dl  = -AQAP, 2 (1) 
where Dl is the deadweight gain from in- 
creased production efficiency, AQ is the re- 
duction in domestic production, and AP is the 
decrease in domestic price following tariff re- 
moval. From the elasticity formula, 
where 
Q,, = the quantity of domestic production 
with tariff 
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Q l  = the quantity of domestic production 
without tariff 
PI, = the domestic price of the good with 
tariff 
E, = the price elasticity of domestic supply 
A, = the change in price following tariff 
removal. 
Substituting the right-hand side of the first 
equation into the second equation and multi- 
plying the numerator and denominator by P,, 
yield: 
AP AP 
Dl = E - P .  2 p* P'l (3, 
Rearranging terms, 
Letting V, = P,,Q,,, the dollar value of domes- 
tic production with the tariff, and t = APE,, 
the relative change in domestic price follow- 
ing tariff removal, yields 
Applying the same procedure to estimate 
the deadweight gain from consumer savings, 
area fbg, yields, 
1 
area fbg = D2 = -q,t2V,, 
2 ( 6 )  
where 
qL1 = the price elasticity of domestic de- 
mand for the good 
V, = the dollar value of domestic con- 
sumption with tariff, or P,C,,. 
All other variables are as defined previously. 
The total deadweight gain from removing 
the tariff is 
1 
DWC = Dl  + D_ - -t2(e,V, + ?,Vd). (7) ? - 2  
The deadweight gain from tariff removal is 
an annual flow beginning the year the tariff is 
eliminated and extending into infinity or until 
the tariff is reinstalled. It is necessary, there- 
fore, to compute the discounted present value 
of the deadweight gains for each year from the 
time of tariff removal to infinity or until the 
tariff is reimposed. I first assume a static no- 
growth case in which domestic demand does 
not grow, as a prelude to a more realistic anal- 
ysis of the growth case later on. 
The present value of an infinite series of 
annual deadweight gains is: 
DWGl DWG, DWG, 
PV, = --- +-+- 
(1 + i)l (1 + i)2 (1 + i)j 
DWG, +- 
(1 + i)"' 
where PV, is the present value of the dead- 
weight gains, DWG, n + and i is the ap- 
propriate real social discount rate. Since no 
growth in benefit occurs, DWG, = DWG, = 
DWG, = DWG, and the previous equation 
can be reduced to PV, = DWGIi, by using 
present value of an infinite series rule. 
I now adopt the more realistic assumption 
that demand for the good will grow at a rate 
of r% annually. The formula for the dead- 
weight gain in year j, Dl, adjusted to reflect 
r% annual growth in demand is: 
1 
DWC, = -t2[e,V, + qdVd(l + r)J]. (9) 
2 
The present value of an annual deadweight 
gain occurring in year j is 
The present value of an infinite series of such 
deadweight gains is: PV, = DWGId, where d 
= i - r. (The exact value of d is: d = [(I + 
i)/(l + r)] - 1. For most purposes, the ap- 
proximate relationship is acceptable. Notice 
that r must be less than i for the solution to 
be defined. If r is greater than i, then the series 
of benefits must be limited to a finite time pe- 
riod for the problem to have a solution. In that 
case, one must use the formula for the present 
value of a terminating annual series with the 
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denominator growing at a constant annual 
amount, or 
' DWG,[(l + d)" - I] 
PV, = C 
1 - 1  d(l + d)" (11) 
where n is the length of the terminating annual 
series. 
Labor displacement costs 
Removal of the tariff may also generate 
costs if workers in the import-competing in- 
dustry are displaced because of the decrease 
in domestic production, Ql,Q,. In a full-em- 
ployment economy, and in the absence of 
wage rigidity, displaced workers would find 
alternative employment immediately and there 
would be little or no social cost associated 
with the reduction in production. Full employ- 
ment is often assumed in studies of U.S. trade 
liberalization studies (i.e., Markre and Tarr 
1980; Tarr and Markre 1984; Roussland and 
Soumela 1985; Hufbauer and Elliott 1994). In 
developing countries, however, there typically 
are high unemployment and limited alternative 
job opportunities. It cannot be assumed that 
displaced workers will soon find alternative 
employment. Until they do, the social oppor- 
tunity cost of their displacement offsets some 
of the gains from lower cost imports. 
There is no clear measure of the cost of la- 
bor displacement. I will use the procedure sug- 
gested by Magee (1972). Magee argues that 
the social cost of resource allocation caused 
by trade liberalization is the value added lost 
by the displaced labor while searching for new 
.jobs. I use the compensation lost by workers 
who lost their jobs as an approximation of the 
value added by these workers. The assumption 
is that workers are compensated roughly ac- 
cording to their marginal value product. Ad- 
mittedly, this is a strong assumption, especial- 
ly if the labor market is distorted by govern- 
ment employment policies and labor unions. 
An alternative approach that may be available 
to analysts is to use the value added by the 
sawmilling industry, taken from industry sur- 
veys, if available. This is a more direct esti- 
mate of the social cost. However, 1 did not 
have access to that information for the Phil- 
ippines. 
The estimate of the social cost of labor dis- 
placement is accomplished in three steps: (1) 
estimate the reduction in production following 
tariff removal, Q,Q,; (2) estimate the number 
of workers displaced by the reduction in pro- 
duction; and (3) estimate the compensation 
that would have otherwise been earned by dis- 
placed workers. 
Given information on the supply elasticity 
of the good, the amount of the tariff and the 
level of domestic production prior to tariff re- 
moval, the reduction in production can be 
found by manipulating the supply elasticity 
formula to yield a formula for estimating the 
change in production, AQ, as follows: 
where APEd is also the ad valorem tariff, t, so 
that, AQ = e,tQo where all variables are de- 
fined as before. The number of workers dis- 
placed by the reduction in production, AL, is 
equal to AL = aAQ, where a is the labor- 
output coefficient and AQ is the reduction in 
production. I assume that there are no econo- 
mies of scale in the production of the good, 
so that the labor-output coefficient is constant 
for all levels of production. The total annual 
compensation lost because of labor displace- 
ment, LC, is derived by multiplying the num- 
ber of workers laid off, AL, by the annual 
compensation of sawmill workers, w, or LC = 
wAL. 
Compensation lost is an annual cost and is 
incurred as long as the workers remain un- 
employed. It is necessary, therefore, to esti- 
mate the duration of unemployment and to 
compute the present value of the time stream 
of compensation losses. In addition, if the new 
job pays less than the old job, then the wage 
differential between the two jobs represents a 
second source of compensation loss, extending 
from reemployment into infinity. Thus, the 
present value of the compensation lost due to 
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tariff removal consists of two parts: the pre- 
sent value of the compensation lost during un- 
employment; and the present value of any 
wage differential beginning with reemploy- 
ment and extending into infinity. Mathemati- 
cally, 
' LC,, + PV, = 2 - ALC 
, I  1 + i )  i(1 + i)l (1 3) 
where PV, is the present value of the social 
cost of displaced labor, LC is the compensa- 
tion lost due to labor displacement, ALC is the 
differential between sawmill wage and wage 
in the new job beginning in year j, i is the 
social discount rate, and n is the number of 
years workers are unemployed. 
After obtaining the estimate of the present 
value of labor displacement cost, the net ben- 
efit from trade liberalization can be computed 
as: PV, - PV, = Net Benefit. This completes 
the development of the theoretical trade lib- 
eralization model. The model will now be ap- 
plied to estimate the welfare effects of remov- 
ing the Philippine lumber import tariff. 
APPLICATION OF THE MODE[* 
The Philippine lumber irnport tarifl 
The model described in the previous section 
is now used to estimate the welfare effects of 
removing the 20% Philippine lumber import 
tariff. The Philippines satisfies the small coun- 
try definition as a producer, consumer, and 
trader of hardwood lumber. The Philippines 
accounts for only 0.4% of global hardwood 
lumber production, 0.7% of hardwood lumber 
imports. and 0.4% of hardwood lumber ex- 
ports (Food and Agriculture Organization 
1998). It is thus reasonable to use a partial 
equilibrium model of trade liberalization. 
The welfare effects of tariff removal depend 
upon the changes in lumber price and quantity 
following tariff removal. Unfortunately, one 
cannot simply compare prices and quantities 
before and after tariff removal, because a 
number of other factors that affect lumber 
prices, production, and consumption may have 
changed in the interim. Instead, one must es- 
timate post-tariff lumber prices and quantities. 
To do this, I use estimates of lumber demand 
and supply elasticities from a Philippines lum- 
ber market model developed by the author for 
the Philippines Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (Wisdom 1994). The 
estimated lumber demand (qd) and supply (E,) 
price elasticities are: - 1.15, and 0.67, respec- 
tively. 
Welfare implications 
In this section I estimate the welfare impli- 
cations of removing the 20% Philippine lum- 
ber import tariff. All values are in real terms 
and the real social discount rate is used, there- 
by avoiding the difficult problem of prqjecting 
the rate of inflation. Deciding upon the appro- 
priate real annual social discount rate is al- 
ways difficult, calling for a great deal of judg- 
ment. Markandya and Pearce (1991) discuss 
the problem of choosing the appropriate social 
discount rate for analysis of projects in devel- 
oping countries. The year 1996, the latest year 
for which information is available on Philip- 
pine lumber production, imports, and exports, 
is assumed to be the year targeted for tariff 
removal. I considered using the year targeted 
by APEC for tariff removals, but that would 
require projecting the relevant variables and 
divert attention from the primary thrust of this 
section of the paper, demonstration of the ap- 
plication of the model, without adding signif- 
icantly to it. 
Weljiare gains.-The estimated 1996 values 
for the key parameters of the deadweight gain 
formula are as follows: V, = $49,14 1,000; V, 
= $153,359,000; q, = -1.15; E, = 0.67; and 
t = 20%. The value of domestic production 
was obtained by multiplying Philippine lum- 
ber production in 1996 (3 13,000,000 cubic 
meters) by the average unit price of lumber 
exports (e.g., $157/cum). The value of domes- 
tic consumption was obtained by subtracting 
lumber exports from production, plus imports. 
All data are taken from the Food and Agri- 
cultural Organization (FAO) forest products 
database (FA0 1998) and official Philippine 
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statistical reports. The lumber demand and 
supply elasticities are derived from the lumber 
market model. 
The deadweight gain in the first year is, 
DWG, = 1/2(0.2)'. [(0.65)($49.14) 
+ (1.15)($153.36)] 
= (0.02). [$31.94 + $176.361 
= $4.17 million. (14) 
I now calculate the present value of the per- 
petual series, in which demand grows 4% each 
year, and the social rate of discount is 10% 
annually. The Philippine Forest Master Plan 
uses two domestic lumber consumption 
growth scenarios: a low rate of 3.5% and a 
high rate of 4.496, and a 10% real discount 
rate (Forest Management Bureau 1990). Krug- 
man et al. (1992) state that the real interest 
rate on T-bills in the Philippines has hovered 
around 10% in recent years. Paris and Ruzicka 
(1991) use a 10% real rate to evaluate Phil- 
ippine forest charges. 
The present value of a perpetual series of 
deadweight gains, beginning at $4.17 millions, 
with lumber demand increasing 4% annually, 
and discounted at a 10% real social discount 
rate, is 
DWG $4.17 
PV, = -= -
1 - r 0.06 
= $69.50 million. (15) 
Thus the deadweight gain from removing the 
lumber import tariff is $69.50 million. 
Labor displacement costs.-Following the 
procedure described earlier, the social cost of 
labor displacement is estimated in three steps. 
Recall that the reduction in lumber production 
in response to tariff removal, AQ,  is equal to 
hQ = E;Q,,~, where A Q  is the change in lum- 
ber production, E, = 0.67, Q,, = 313 thousand 
cubic meters in 1996, and t = 0.2. Substituting 
these values into the equation yields A Q  = 
0.67.3 13,000.0.2 = 42.9 thousand cubic me- 
ters. The average labor-to-lumber coefficient 
for the Philippines, based on official statistics 
for the three-year period, 1987-1989, is 18 
workers per thousand cubic meters of lumber 
(National Statistical Coordination Board 
1991). Substituting into the equation for 
change in employment yields AL = aAQ = 
18.42.9 = 773 workers. 
Finally, I estimate the annual compensation 
forgone by unemployed sawmill workers. Ra- 
mirez and Laarman (1993) estimate the aver- 
age conlpensation of workers in the sawmill- 
ing and planning mills industry in 1988 to be 
$940 for large establishments (10 or more em- 
ployees) and $364.81 for small establishments 
(fewer than 10 employees). Average annual 
compensation, weighted by total number of 
employees in each category, is $896.85. Ad- 
justing for inflation, the estimated annual com- 
pensation in 1996 is $2,042. Multiplying an- 
nual compensation by the number of workers 
displaced yields the annual loss in compen- 
sation, or LC = $2,042.773 = $1.58 million, 
where LC is the value added (compensation) 
lost each year the workers are unemployed. 
The next step is to estimate the present val- 
ue of the compensation losses for the duration 
of unemployment. The approach outlined in 
the theoretical portion of this paper is to first 
estimate the duration of unemployment, and 
then compute the present value of the time 
stream of compensation losses. Unfortunately, 
the information necessary to estimate length 
of unemployment and likely wage of the new 
job is not available for the Philippines. More 
to the point, firing employees is not the most 
likely response of sawmill operators to a re- 
duction in lumber production. Instead, mill op- 
erators are likely to reduce the number of 
hours worked by some or all employees, and 
attempt to keep all or most at least partly em- 
ployed. Thus, a more realistic scenario is for 
sawmill operators to adjust their labor force to 
the lower production levels by placing some 
workers on less than a full 40-hour weekly 
work schedule, while attempting to maintain 
the pool of workers as a whole. This scenario 
is supported by official unemployment statis- 
tics. For 1991, the distribution of employment 
by number of hours worked is: less than 20 
employees = 8.7%, 20 to 29 employees = 
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10.5%, 30 to 39 employees = 12.9%, artd 40 
or more employees = 67.2% (National Statis- 
tical Coordination Board 199 1). 
The average number of hours worked by 
those worlung less than 40 hours a week, 
weighted by the number of workers in each 
category, is 25 hours. I assume that workers 
affected by the reduction in lumber production 
do not lose their jobs but, instead, experience 
a reduction in hours worked weekly from 40 
to 25 hours, or a 37.5% reduction in hours 
worked. A combination of reduced number of 
hours worked and compensation per hour is 
possible. It also is possible that some workers 
would lose their jobs completely, and it is un- 
likely that the reduction in compensation will 
be precisely proportional to the reduction in 
hours worked, because of fixed labor costs. All 
things considered, however, the assumption 
that reduced labor demand will be accom- 
plished by an across-the-board 37.5% reduc- 
tion in hours worked seems reasonable. 
Recall that the estimated average compen- 
sation rate in 1994 for sawmill workers is 
$2,042. If compensation of workers affected 
by the reduction in lumber production is re- 
duced by 37.5%, or to $1,276, the social cost 
of this reduction is $766 annually. If this dif- 
ferential persists into the foreseeable future, 
the present value of this perpetual annual se- 
ries of compensation losses by displaced saw- 
mill workers due to tariff removal, discounted 
at 10%, is $7,660 per worker. Multiplying the 
present value of compensation loss per worker 
by the total number of workers affected, I ob- 
tain an estimate of the total present value of 
social cost of labor displacement attributable 
to removal of the lumber import tariff, or PV, 
= $7,660.773 = $5.92 million. 
This procedure overstates labor displace- 
ment costs to the extent that some workers 
will seek and find alternative full-time em- 
ployment. There is, however, no objective ba- 
sis for estimating either the number of workers 
that will do this or when they will obtain full 
employment. 
The net present value of turiff reinoval.- 
The net present value of removing the lumber 
import tariff PV,,,, is the positive efficiency 
gains from trade, PV,, less the reduction in 
value added by workers displaced by the re- 
duction in production, PV,, or, PV,, = PV, - 
PV, = $69.50 million - $5.92 millions = 
$63.58 million. This is a 12:l benefit-cost ra- 
tio, indicating a significant social benefit to the 
Philippines from removing the tariff. Labor 
displacement costs, while significant, are over- 
whelmed by the benefit from trade. The harsh 
economic reality is that labor is in ample sup- 
ply in the Philippines, whereas hardwood lum- 
ber is increasingly scarce, largely because of 
the combined effect of restrictions on domes- 
tic timber harvesting and the lumber import 
tariff. Thus, the social opportunity cost of the 
jobs lost is modest compared to the social op- 
portunity cost of the artificially scarce lumber. 
SLMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A comparative statics model is developed 
and used to measure the welfare effects of re- 
moving the Philippine lumber export tariff. 
The major strengths of the model are that it 
directly compares the gains from trade with 
the labor displacement costs of trade, and 
computes the discounted present value of both 
the benefits and costs from the time the trade 
restriction is removed into the future, or until 
the restriction is reimposed. The model is flex- 
ible and can be applied with minor modifica- 
tion to a broad range of tracle liberalization 
actions, such as the removal of log and lumber 
export bans. The model can also be modified 
for use in spatial price equilibrium models that 
involve several demand and supply regions. 
Given sufficient information, multiple market 
levels can also be included (e.g., timber har- 
vesting, furniture manufacturing). The model 
has the advantage of simplicity and modest 
data requirements. Its modest data require- 
ments make it especially attractive for use in 
small economies with limited information on 
domestic forest products production, prices, 
and trade. 
The model has important limitations that 
must be kept in mind when deciding whether 
W~.WIO~I~-WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 3 27 
to use it and in interpreting the results. The 
model assumes that the imported good and do- 
mestic good are perfect substitutes even 
though in practice it is likely that the imported 
forest product will be an imperfect substitute 
for the domestic good. The model does not 
consider impacts that may occur outside the 
industry whose protection is removed, or the 
possible change in environmental externalities 
associated with domestic production of the 
protected good if the trade restriction is re- 
moved. Modeling these broader effects would 
require a significantly more complex model, 
such as a computable general equilibrium 
model, or at the least, a multi-market level 
model. 
Most importantly, however, the model does 
not address the equity considerations of the 
welfare transfers if trade is liberalized. The 
model demonstrates that the welfare gain by 
consumers exceeds the welfare loss of sawmill 
workers; that is, consumers could compensate 
workers for their loss and still have some gain 
left over. The questions of whether, in fact, 
workers should be compensated, and if so, 
how, is a political question. It is a very im- 
portant question. The gains from trade model 
constitute only one piece of information de- 
cision-makers should use in deciding whether 
or not to remove the lumber export tariff. In 
that sense, the model can make a useful con- 
tribution to the often acrimonious debate over 
the tradeoff between the gains from trade and 
employment costs of trade liberalization pro- 
posals. The model has the considerable virtue 
of presenting commensurate measures of the 
potential gains from trade and job losses, 
thereby facilitating the evaluation of the net 
effect of proposed trade liberalization. 
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